Ronald Bradshaw v. Walter W. Kershaw : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Ronald Bradshaw v. Walter W. Kershaw : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gustin and Gustin; Attorneys for Appellant, Walter W Kershaw; Robert C Cummings and Mark S
Miner; Attorney for Appellants, Willard B Rogers, Edward B Rogers and Rockefeller Land and
Livestock Livestock Company .
Robert S Campbell, Jr and Phillip C Pugsley; Attorneys for Respondent Ronald Bradshaw.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bradshaw v. Kershaw, No. 13502.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/741
K13C1SIVED 
T A W T j p p A p y 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT" C 6 1975 
OF T H E IROUft YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
STATE OF UTAff1^11 ^ai* *"aw $dM*A 
Case No. 
RONALD BRADSHAW, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WALTER W KERSHAW, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
HELEN G. KERSHAW, . 
Defendant, f ^P02 
and 
WILLARD B. ROGERS, EDWARD B. 
R O G E R S and ROCKEFELLER 
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT WALTER W. KERSHAW 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court for Millard County, Utah 
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns, Judge 
G U S T I N & G U S T I N 
1610 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Appellant 
Walter W. Kershaw 
Corporatiom 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., & 
PHILLIP C. PUGSLEY 
El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent Ronald Bradshaw-
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS & 
MARK S. MINER 
320 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Appellants 
Willard B. Rogers, Edward B. 
Rogers and Rockefeller Land & 
Livestock Company, a Utah Q 
! IN 
IT"*3 
1 
1974 
". U+ah 
ffTV IITAU p u n u r 4R7.MSI 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I. THE OPTION AGREEMENT (EX-
HIBIT P-4) WAS A ONE PURPOSE DOCU-
MENT AND HAD NO VITALITY AFTER 
THE LOAN A P P L I C A T I O N WAS RE-
JECTED 8 
POINT II. ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE RELATED 
SOLELY TO PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE 
G O V E R N M E N T AGENCY AND WERE 
ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED TO PLAIN-
TIFF 10 
POINT III. THE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE IS NOT A V A I L A B L E TO 
PLAINTIFF 12 
POINT IV. THE ALLEGED TENDER AND THE 
DECREE REQUIRING PERFORMANCE BY 
THIS DEFENDANT ARE FATALLY DE-
FECTIVE 16 
CONCLUSION 18 
CASES CITED 
Basler vs. Warren, 59 F. 2d 41 (1947), 10th Cir 9 
BunneU vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597 (1962) 14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
Cornwall vs. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 
2d 160, 369 P. 2d 928 (1962) 9 
HoUand vs. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P. 2d 989 
(1960) 18 
Humphries vs. Remco, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 348, 517 P. 
2d 1309 (1974) 11 
Intermountain Farmers Assoc, vs. Peart, 30 Utah 2d 
201, 515 P. 2d 614 (1973) 15 
Roy S. Ludlow Investment Co. vs. Taggart, 29 Utah 
2d 349, 509 P. 2d 818 (1973) 15 
D. H. Overmyer Co. vs. Brown, 439 F. 2d 926, 10th 
Cir., (1971) 14 
Pitcher vs. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d 491 
(1967) 14 
Vulcan Steel Corporation vs. Markosian, 23 Utah 2d 
287, 462 P. 2d 166 (1969) 9 
Vulcarce vs. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d 427 
(1961) 14 
ANNOTATIONS 
A. L. R. 2d, Later Case Service, Page 606 13 
5 A. L. R. 2d 287 12 
TEXTS 
71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Performance, Section 221 .... 17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
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STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD BRADSHAW, 
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vs. 
WALTER W. KERSHAW, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
HELEN G. KERSHAW, 
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and 
WILLARD B. ROGERS, EDWARD B. 
R O G E R S and ROCKEFELLER 
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. J 
Case No. 
13502 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT WALTER W. KERSHAW 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff claims specific performance under an alleged 
option agreement executed by this appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant Kershaw was the original sole defendant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(R. 1-13). By his second amended complaint (R. 49-52) 
plaintiff interjected appellants Willard B. Rogers, Ed-
ward B. Rogers and Rockefeller Land and Livestock 
Company, a corporation, as parties defendant, hereinafter 
sometimes collectively called "Rogers", demanding judg-
ment to the effect that any interest claimed by them be 
declared inferior and subject to the claimed prior interest 
of the plaintiff in the subject real property. Appellant 
Kershaw's answer and counterclaim (R. 28-32) was 
adopted by stipulation as his answer to those portions 
of the second amended complaint which pertained to him 
(R. 53). 
Subsequently the Rogers filed an answer and coun-
terclaim asserting title in their favor and demanding that 
their title be quieted against the claims of plaintiff (R. 
65). Thereafter the Rogers filed a cross-claim against 
appellant Kershaw on the theory of breach of warranty 
and named Helen G. Kershaw as a party defendant (R. 
68). The Kershaws, husband and wife, filed their answer 
(R. 73-75) to the cross-claim of the Rogers denying the 
connotation of a warranty and alleging, among other 
things, that any conveyance to them was by quit-claim 
with the knowledge on the part of the Rogers that the 
Kershaws were conveying no more of an interest than 
they had both in fact and in law and that the Rogers 
knew or should have known of adverse claims. 
A jury was impaneled at the request of the Rogers. 
Upon motion of appellant Kershaw, joined in by the 
plaintiff, the jury was discharged over the objection of 
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the Rogers. The trial court documented the grounds for 
the discharge of the jury in its findings of fact (R. 222-
223). 
The judgment and order, likewise prepared by the 
trial court, contains the same recitals with reference to 
the discharge of the jury (R. 231-233). The option relied 
upon by plaintiff was held to be a viable instrument in 
his hands and appellant Kershaw was required by the 
judgment to deliver to plaintiff "a general warranty deed" 
to the subject property upon payment of "the amount 
set forth in the agreement." After the date on which the 
conveyance is required to be made under paragraph 1 of 
the judgment and order, the Rogers and all persons claim-
ing under them will be enjoined and debarred from claim-
ing or asserting any estate or claim with respect to the 
subject property or any part thereof (R. 233). The 
counterclaim of the Rogers against the plaintiff was dis-
missed and likewise the cross-claim of the Rogers against 
this appellant and his wife, Helen G. Kershaw. Plaintiff 
was awarded court costs in the amount of $119.00 and 
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000.00 against this 
appellant. 
The judgment and order referred to above was pre-
ceded by a memorandum decision (R. 136-142) which, 
among other things, directed the plaintiff to prepare find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment with an 
opportunity given to this appellant and to others to make 
timely objections to the plaintiff's proposals. The docu-
mentation as proposed by the plaintiff (R. 200b-209) 
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was objected to by this appellant (R. 210-219) and the 
subject of a written order (R. 220-221) which order im-
mediately preceded the documentation of the final judg-
ment and order by the trial judge. The latter documents, 
including the findings of fact, are at variance in some 
respects with the memorandum decision. The trial judge 
omitted some of the factual comments previously stated 
in its memorandum. 
The judgment and supporting documents as docu-
mented by the trial judge were challenged by this appel-
lant by his motion for new trial and for other or alterna-
tive relief (R. 237-239), and, after oral argument, were 
overruled and denied (R. 248). This appeal followed (R. 
257-258). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Kershaw respectfully urges that the alleged 
option was not a viable instrument in the hands of plain-
tiff; that the judgment appealed from is erroneous in di-
recting the execution of a general warranty deed; that 
there was no proper tender by the plaintiff; no basis for 
the award of attorney's fees and that for those and other 
reasons to be hereafter urged the judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff against this appellant should be reversed in 
its entirety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Milton Christensen, named as the buyer in the op-
tion agreement, Exhibit P-4, was purchasing the Kimball 
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Ranch consisting of some 985 acres from appellant Ker-
shaw for a price of approximately $135,000.00 under a 
contract of sale (Rep. tr. 138-141). The Prudential Life 
Insurance Company had a mortgage of $100,000.00 on 
the Kimball Ranch upon which appellant Kershaw was 
the maker (Rep. tr. 152). The properties described in 
the option are adjacent to the Kimball property (Exhibit 
P-l). 
Parcel No. 1, the 480 acres described in the option 
agreement, was the subject of negotiations in 1969 be-
tween Marion Kesler, a witness for the plaintiff, and 
Christensen, likewise a witness for the plaintiff. Mr. 
Christensen acted as agent for Mr. Kershaw in the nego-
tiations (Rep. tr. 143-146). The 480 acres is included 
within the Staples escrow agreement, Exhibit P-2. Brad-
shaw was aware of the escrow agreement (Rep. tr. 206-
207) and that the 480 acres could not be severed until 
the payout under the escrow and that in addition, 
$7,200.00 remained to be paid to Kesler (Rep. tr. 208). 
Christensen filed for bankruptcy in May, 1970, and 
had not been discharged as of the time of the assignment 
of the option to plaintiff Bradshaw. Appellant Kershaw 
was listed as a creditor of Christensen to the extent of 
approximately $40,000.00 (Rep. tr. 554) on matters per-
taining to the Kimball Ranch (Rep. tr. 152). 
Christensen testified to having met with Mr. Ker-
shaw during the forepart of August, 1970, in the latter's 
home in Salt Lake City, at which time the payment to 
Kesler of $7,200.00 in connection with Parcel No. 1, and 
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the payment to Mrs. Grace Staples of $2,850.00, in con-
nection with Parcel No. 2 in the option were discussed 
along with refinancing the purchase of the Kimball farm 
in connection with which there was an arrearage not only 
to Mr. Kershaw, but also to Prudential Life Insurance 
Company. Christensen equated this conversation with 
the signing of the option agreement, Exhibit P-4. Chris-
tensen testified that Mr. Kershaw was desirous of liqui-
dating all of his interests in Millard County and to make 
arrangements for Christensen to take over the Kimball 
farm, the 480 acre tract and the 80 acre tract (Rep. tr. 
151-154). 
Mr. Kershaw testified that Exhibit P-4 was but a 
blank form when signed by him (Rep. tr. 531). An ar-
rangement had been worked out by Mr. Kershaw, Mr. 
Christensen, and Prudential Life Insurance Company 
whereby Christensen would have until 12:00 noon on 
November 15, 1970, to refinance the purchase of the Kim-
ball Ranch. Mr. Kershaw was attempting to do everything 
he could to assist Christensen in those particulars (Rep. 
tr. 539). 
Exhibit P-4 was signed by Mr. Kershaw on July 20, 
1970 Mr. Christensen representing that the document was 
necessary in support of a loan application to Farmers 
Home Administration (Rep, tr. 510). The trial court 
found, contrary to Mr. Kershaw's testimony, that the form 
had been completed as to its typewritten portions prior to 
Mr. Kershaw's signature. Mr. Kershaw's intent, never-
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theless, was consistent with the testimony of Christensen 
as indicated above. 
Christensen on August 5, 1970, presented the option 
agreement with a farm and home plan to the office of 
Farmers Home Administration in Millard County (Rep. 
tr. 345-346). The applicattion was denied on September 
15, 1970, after review by the agency's county committee 
(Rep. tr. 348-351). The form, Exhibit P-4, is a standard 
form prepared by the government agency, printed by the 
agency, and furnished to all loan applicants (Rep. tr. 345). 
On December 1, 1970, Mr. Kershaw received a com-
munication from attorney Weston Bayles to the effect 
that Christensen was claiming the option agreement as 
a viable document. The communication resulted in im-
mediate repercussion, including a meeting in Mr. Bayles' 
office with Christensen, Bradshaw, Rogers and Kershaw. 
Mr. Kershaw verbally repudiated the option (Rep. tr. 
515-517) and advised everyone that he was selling or had 
sold whatever property interests he had in properties in 
Millard County to the Rogers (Rep. tr. 515). Christen-
sen testified that he was threatened with physical vio-
lence by Kershaw at the meeting in the attorney's office 
and that considerable ill feeling existed. Christensen re-
corded the option agreement December 23, 1970. 
On January 8, 1971, appellant Kershaw was advised 
by letter, Exhibit 7, that Bradshaw was the owner of the 
option and that upon the execution of a warranty deed 
signed by Walter W. Kershaw and Dorothy W. Kershaw 
and delivering the same to the escrow holder, Kershaw 
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would be paid the sum of $9,950.00 (R. 12). Christensen 
had assigned the option agreement to Bradshaw for a 
consideration of $5,000.00, $500.00 of which was paid to 
Christensen on the 8th day of January and the remain-
ing $4,500.00 was to be paid, conditioned upon the suc-
cessful outcome of the litigation that had been anticipated 
by Mr. Kershaw's previous repudation of the option 
agreement. 
The record does not disclose the marital status of 
Mr. Kershaw at the time of the option agreement or as 
of the date of the alleged tender which was coupled with 
the demand that the warranty deed be signed by both 
Walter W. Kershaw and Dorothy W. Kershaw. No judg-
ment was entered as against Helen G. Kershaw, the wife 
of Walter W. Kershaw. The requirement of the signature 
of Dorothy W. Kershaw on a warranty deed as a condi-
tion precedent to the payment of the money held in es-
crow was one of the several issues presented to the trial 
court and ruled upon adversely to this appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE O P T I O N AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT 
P-4) WAS A ONE PURPOSE DOCUMENT 
AND HAD NO VITALITY AFTER THE 
LOAN APPLICATION WAS REJECTED. 
In the interpretation of a contract, the universal rule 
requires the court to determine what the parties intended 
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by what they said. "The court may not add, ignore or 
discard words in the process * * *." Cornwall vs. 
Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P. 2d 
928 (1962). In Basler vs. Warren, 159 F. 2d 41 (1947), 
the 10th Cir., applying Utah law to the construction of a 
contract, asserted as a universal cannon of construction 
that every word and phrase in a contract should be given 
a meaning and signification according to its importance 
in the context of the contract, and stated: 
"Courts are not warranted in reading out of a 
contract words or phrases placed there by the 
contracting party unless they cannot be ration-
ally fitted into the scheme of agreement be-
tween the parties." 
The rule that the court may not add, ignore or dis-
card words in the process of interpretation is the holding 
in Vulcan Steel Corporation vs. Markosian, 23 Utah 2d 
287,462 P. 2d 166 (1969). 
Within the concept of the foregoing is that portion 
of Paragraph No. 2 of the option agreement, Exhibit P-4, 
which reads as follows: 
"2. This option is given to enable the Buyer 
to obtain a loan insured or made by the United 
States of America, acting through the Farm-
ers Home Administration, United States De-
partment of Agriculture and its duly author-
ized representatives, (hereinafter called the 
'Government'), for the purchase of said prop-
erty. I t is agreed that the Buyer's efforts to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
obtain a loan constitute a part of the consid-
eration for this option." 
The application for the loan was made by Christen-
sen and was rejected by Farmers Home Administration 
on or prior to September 15, 1970. The rejection of the 
loan frustrated and terminated the entire contract. 
POINT II. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE RELATED SOLE-
LY TO PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE GOV-
ERNMENT AGENCY AND WERE ERRON-
EOUSLY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF. 
Finding No. 12 (R. 228) includes, among other things, 
"* * * the parties stipulated that $2,000.00 is a rea-
sonable fee for the work performed by counsel for and in 
behalf of the Plaintiff * * *." There is nothing in 
the written record with reference to the amount of attor-
ney's fees or the stipulation specified by the trial court. 
Although the record is silent on the subject, this 
appellant concedes that it was stipulated that if counsel 
for the plaintiff was duly sworn and examined that he 
would testify that $2,000.00 was a reasonable attorney's 
fee. The amount was not challenged but the stipulation 
reserved the legal issue as to whether plaintiff under the 
terms of the option, Exhibit P-4, was entitled to recover 
attorney's fees from this appellant. The issue thus pre-
sented is related to the matters discussed under POINT 
I above. 
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Paragraph No. 4 of Exhibit P-4 reads as follows: 
"4. The Seller agrees to pay all expenses of 
title clearance including, if required, abstract 
or certificate of title or policy of title insur-
ance, continued down to the date of accept-
ance of this option and thereafter continued 
down to and including date of recordation of 
the deed from the Seller to the Buyer, costs 
of survey, if required, and attorney's fees; and 
the Seller agrees that, except as herein pro-
vided, all taxes, liens, encumbrances or other 
interests in third persons will be satisfied, dis-
charged, or paid by him including stamp taxes 
and other expenses incident to the preparation 
and execution of the deed and other evidences 
of title. Title evidences will he obtained from 
persons and be in such form as the Govern-
ment shall approve" (Emphasis added) 
The expressed purpose of the option being that of 
enabling the buyer to obtain a loan insured or made by 
the government through FHA, the provision with respect 
to attorney's fees can apply only to the efforts of the 
government with respect to "title clearance" for the pur-
pose of the option. The language with respect to attor-
ney's fees must be measured within the context of the 
expressed purpose of the option. 
In the recent case of Humphries vs. Remco, Inc., 30 
Utah 2d 348, 517 P. 2d 1309 (1974), this Court reaffirmed 
the long recognized rule that attorney's fees are not 
awarded in the absence of statute or express agreement 
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of the parties except perhaps in punitive damage actions. 
There is no contractual commitment in the option agree-
ment, viewed in light of its purpose, that plaintiff can 
avail himself of with reference to attorney's fees and the 
trial court erred in that respect. 
POINT III. 
THE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORM-
ANCE IS NOT AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF. 
Contrary to what is said in POINT I above, there 
are courts that hold that the language relating to the 
expressed purpose of the parties can be ignored and that 
specific performance of an option can be required even 
though the loan application is denied and the expressed 
purpose of the document thus frustrated. Perhaps it may 
be said that like "-beauty" words that might be conceived 
to have logical and normal import are measured only in 
"the eye of the beholder". 
Specific performance of a contract for the sale of 
real property as affected by a provision making it condi-
tional upon the purchaser obtaining a loan is the subject 
of a fairly extensive annotation in 5 A. L. R. 2d 287. The 
annotator by way of an introductory statement calls at-
tention to the vagaries of judicial expressions and after 
pointing to the concept that courts have considered them-
selves definitely bound by general principles of specific 
performance law relating to mutuality, certainty, and def-
initeness states by way of summary a concept that gives 
concern to all. The summary states in part as follows: 
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" * * * a broad survey of the cases coming 
within the scope of the annotation results in 
the conclusions that a court, having made up 
its mind as to the party with whom the general 
equities as to the allowance or refusal of spe-
cific performance of the contract in suit lie, 
may, by the exercise of a little ingenuity, find 
adequate precedents among the prior decisions 
involving specific performance law generally, 
to support whatever decision it wants to make 
in the particular case before it as to the effect 
upon the right to specific performance of the 
appearance in the contract of a stipulation 
making the sale contingent upon the purchas-
er's procuring a loan." (Emphasis added) 
The -annotation mentioned above is supplemented in 
A. L. JR. 2d, Later Case Service, Page 606. In both anno-
tations there are cases dealing with printed forms fur-
nished by government agencies, including FHA. There 
are cases in the annotation that support the one purpose 
concept and others that are contrary to that position. 
On the other hand, there are courts that have resolved 
the apparent inequities of the situation by resorting to 
the concept of lack of mutuality. In the instant case 
Exhibit P-4 in its printed form, as furnished by the gov-
ernment agency, provides in Paragraph No. 10 the fol-
lowing: 
"10. The Seller agrees that, irrespective of 
any other provision in this option, the Buyer, 
or his assignees, may, if the option is accepted, 
without any liability therefor refuse to accept 
conveyance of the property described herein 
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if the foresaid loan cannot be made or insured 
because of defects in the title to other land now 
owned by, or being purchased by, the buyer/' 
(Emphasis added) 
The provision of the option, as last above quoted, 
gives the buyer an advantage not enjoyed by the seller. 
The seller's property remains subjected to the option 
and during the term thereof, he is restricted from dispos-
ing of the property and the buyer is under no obligation 
to purchase if the loan application is denied by reason 
of defects in title to land peculiar to the buyer and con-
cerning which the seller has no interest and under which 
he has no control. 
That the contract is incomplete, indefinite, and in-
equitable as to substantial and material matters appears 
to us to be obvious. The Utah case law to the effect that 
such a contract will not be specifically enforced is sum-
marized in D. H. Overmyer Co. vs. Brown, 439 F. 2d 926, 
10th Cir., (1971). This case cites Bunnell vs. Bills, 13 
Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597 (1962); Pitcher vs. Lauritzen, 
18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d 491 (1967); Vulcarce vs. Bitters, 
12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d 427 (1961). As to the latter case 
this Court is held to have stated: 
" * * * that the courts cannot 'fabricate' the 
kind of a contract the parties ought to have 
made and then enforce it." 
As to the Pitcher case, the 10th Cir. attributes to 
this court that specific performance cannot be required 
unless "all terms of the agreement are clear." 
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Tested by the rule of clarity Parcel No. 1 as set forth 
in the option agreement concludes with the words "Price 
$7,200.00". Parcel No. 2 concludes with the words "Bal-
ance $2,850.00". What do these words mean? As to Par-
cel No. 2, the expression "Contractual agreement" be-
tween Grace W. Staples and this appellant was construed 
by plaintiff's witness Christensen to mean "contractural 
arrangement" (Rep. tr. 299). Christensen, the scrivener 
of all typewritten portions, construed the words as requir-
ing him to pay the balance of $2,850.00 to Mrs. Grace W. 
Staples (Rep. tr. 298). 
The meaning of the price of $7,200.00 appearing at 
the end of Parcel No. 1 is equally vague and uncertain. 
The record shows that the real property specifically de-
scribed under Parcel No. 1 was a part of an escrow ar-
rangement involving other property and property inter-
ests and that the 480 acres could not be severed until the 
Staples escrow had been paid and discharged. This in-
volved the payment of some $20,000.00 to $25,000.00 at 
the time of the option agreement. Bradshaw was aware 
of these facts (Rep. tr. 208). Bradshaw was aware of the 
agreements with Mrs. Staples and that appellant Ker-
shaw did not have title to the real property specifically 
described in Parcel No. 2 (Rep. tr. 279). This court in 
the case of Intermountain Farmers Assoc, vs. Peart, 30 
Utah 2d 201, 515 P. 2d 614 (1973), held that where both 
the buyer and seller knew that the seller did not have 
title, the mutual mistake of fact precluded specific per-
formance. To the same effect is Roy S. Ludlow Invest-
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merit Co. vs. Taggart, 29 Utah 2d 349, 509 P. 2d 818 
(1973). 
Bradshaw knew that there was no existing well per-
mit on the 480 acre tract. Christensen had intended to 
move an existing well permit from the Kimball Ranch 
to the 480 acre tract but never got around to doing it 
(Rep. tr. 254-255). Bradshaw was aware of the Staples 
escrow agreement and the conditions precedent before 
the 480 acre tract could be isolated. 
The uncertainties and ambiguities stated above were 
a calculated risk on the part of Bradshaw when he paid 
Christensen $500.00 on January 8, 1971, leaving the re-
maining payment of $4,500.00 contingent upon his suc-
ceeding in this lawsuit (Rep. tr. 413-414). This alone 
makes the transaction suspect and gives rise to the equit-
able principle that one coming into a court of equity must 
come with "clean hands". The uncertainties and am-
biguities on the face of the option agreement preclude 
plaintiff's recovery on the theory of specific performance 
and all of the surrounding circumstances show that in 
equity and good conscience he should be precluded from 
the relief of specific performance. 
POINT IV. 
THE ALLEGED TENDER AND THE DE-
CREE REQUIRING PERFORMANCE BY 
THIS DEFENDANT ARE FATALLY DE-
FECTIVE. 
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The judgment and order of the trial court (R. 231-
233) does not specify the amount of money that this 
appellant is to receive upon delivery of the conveyance 
ordered by the court. Paragraph No. 2 is to the effect 
that upon delivery of the conveyance the plaintiff pay 
"the amount set forth in the agreement". In 71 Am. JUT. 
2d, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, Section 221, it is 
stated in part: 
" In awarding specific performance of a land 
contract, the decree should set out a descrip-
tion of the property to be conveyed and the 
price to be paid, rather than referring for those 
matters to the petition and the contract." 
The letter of January 8, 1971, relied upon by plain-
tiff as his tender of performance required a warranty deed 
executed by Walter W. Kershaw and by Dorothy W. Ker-
shaw. Dorothy W. Kershaw is a stranger to the record 
and to these proceedings. The requirement of the deed 
with the two signatures as indicated was never modified 
or diluted. 
There has been no performance or tender of perform-
ance on plaintiff's part. By insisting upon the signature 
of Dorothy W. Kershaw with instructions to the escrow 
holder not to pay the money to this appellant without 
receiving a deed with the signature of Dorothy W. Ker-
shaw, plaintiff does not even come close to the threshhold 
of a court of equity on the premise of specific perform-
ance. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
CONCLUSION 
Milton A. Christensen for the relatively insignificant 
sum of $500.00 betrayed the relationship of trust and con-
fidence with appellant Kershaw and his transaction with 
Bradshaw was tainted within the connotation of Holland 
vs. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P. 2d 989 (1960). I t is 
unnecssary to belabor this point or to suggest there is 
anything that can be remedied by remanding the case 
to the lower court for further proceeding. 
Under plaintiff's theory of the option agreement, a 
form concocted by a government agency, the same ex-
pired by its terms on August 8,1971, and at no time prior 
to the expiration date did plaintiff tender performance 
on his part unrestricted by the unilateral requirement of 
the signature of Dorothy W. Kershaw on the requested 
deed, a requirement that was neither contracted for nor 
a condition that could be met. 
The judgment and decree against this appellant 
should be reversed and as to him the action should be 
dismissed with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
By Harley W. Gustin „it 
Paul H. Liapis 
r Attorneys for Appellant 
Walter W. Kershaw 
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